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Abstract  
Data from the DRIFT-IIa directional dark matter experiment are presented, collected during a 
near continuous 6 month running period.  A detailed calibration analysis comparing data from 
gamma-ray, x-ray and neutron sources to a GEANT4 Monte Carlo simulations reveals an 
efficiency for detection of neutron induced recoils of 94±2(stat.)±5(sys.)%.  Software-based cuts, 
designed to remove non-nuclear recoil events, are shown to reject 
60
Co gamma-rays with a 
rejection factor of better than 8!10
-6
 for all energies above threshold.  An unexpected event 
population has been discovered and is shown here to be due to the alpha-decay of 
222
Rn daughter 
nuclei that have attached to the central cathode.  A limit on the flux of neutrons in the Boulby 
Underground Laboratory is derived from analysis of unshielded and shielded data. 
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1. Introduction 
The determination of the nature of dark matter remains one of the outstanding goals 
of contemporary physics.  The presently favored model for galaxies, including the Milky 
Way, posit the existence of a galactic halo composed of Weakly Interacting Massive 
Particles (WIMPs) [1] which could be the lightest supersymmetric particle (LSP) 
suggested by extensions of the Standard Model of particle physics [2].  Confirmation of 
this model requires the direct observation of WIMP-induced nuclear recoils and to this 
end several experiments have been developed using various technologies.  These include 
the NAIAD and ZEPLIN experiments at the Boulby Underground Laboratory in the UK 
[3][4], CDMS at the Soudan mine in the US [5], and Edelweiss and XENON in the Gran 
Sasso in Italy [6,7]. 
While these experiments are capable of identifying nuclear recoils, only the DRIFT 
project utilizes a technology that can take advantage of the predicted WIMP directional 
signature [8].  This arises from the expectation that the galaxy revolves within an 
effectively stationary WIMP halo such that an Earth-bound detector sees a WIMP ‘wind’ 
incident from the direction of the Solar System’s motion through the galaxy.  
Measurement of the resulting non-isotropic recoil distribution, with respect to a sidereal 
reference frame, produces an asymmetry many times larger than that of annual 
modulation [8].  Furthermore, there is the potential to perform WIMP astronomy to 
determine the true kinematics of particles in the Galactic halo [9]. 
The DRIFT-IIa instrument developed out of earlier work [10, 11, 12, 13] that 
explored the use of a negative ion time projection chambers (NITPC) filled with carbon-
disulfide (CS2) gas.  Energy deposition resulting from an interaction of an incident 
particle with a target gas nucleus produces electron"ion pairs that are then separated by a 
strong electric field applied between a central cathode and readout planes.  CS2 is 
electronegative, and thus it is negative ions, rather than electrons, that are drifted through 
the detector.  These anions experience only thermal diffusion allowing 3D reconstruction 
of the recoil track range and direction [8] without the use of a magnetic field.  On arrival 
at one of the multi-wire proportional chambers readouts (MWPCs) the anions are stripped 
of their electrons; these then avalanche in the normal way to produce signals on the anode 
and grid wires.  The NITPC technology developed for DRIFT can also be used to search 
for Kaluza-Klein axions through observation of their decay to two gamma-rays [14]. 
DRIFT-IIa is the first module of a test array of second-generation 1 m
3
 low-pressure 
NITPCs and is located in the Boulby Underground Laboratory at a depth of 1070 meters 
(2805 meter water equivalent) [15].  The present paper focuses on neutron detection 
efficiency, the gamma-ray discrimination power, a study of the effects of radon and a 
measurement of the flux of neutrons in the Boulby Underground Laboratory.  Work on 
the directional sensitivity and response to alphas of DRIFT-IIa will be covered in detail in 
subsequent papers. 
2. The DRIFT-IIa detector 
A full description of DRIFT-IIa is given in [16]; a short summary is provided here for 
convenience.  A 1.5
3
 m
3 
low background stainless steel vacuum vessel provided 
containment for 40 Torr of CS2.  The CS2 gas, supplied by evaporation from the liquid 
state, flowed through the vessel steadily by means of a mass flow controller at the input 
and a dry pump at the output.  The flow through the system was equivalent to a 1/e flush 
time of 3.15 days.  Within the vacuum vessel were housed two back-to-back TPCs with a 
shared, vertical, central cathode constructed of 20 µm stainless steel wires with 2 mm 
pitch, see Fig. 1.  Two field cages, located on either side of the central cathode, defined 
two drift regions (Z-direction) of 50 cm depth in which recoil events could form.  Charge 
readout of tracks was provided by two MWPCs each comprised of an anode plane of 20 
µm stainless steel wires with 2 mm pitch sandwiched between (1 cm gap) two 
perpendicular grid planes of 100 µm stainless steel wires also with 2 mm pitch.  The 
electrical potential between the grids and the grounded anode planes was -2984 V, which 
yielded a gas gain of ~1000.  The central cathode voltage at -34 kV produced a mean 
operating drift field of 624±4 V/cm.  For each MWPC, 512 grid wires (Y-direction) were 
grouped down to 32 channels, passed to 32 preamplifiers, the outputs of which were 
further grouped down to 8 lines (henceforth ‘lines’ is used to indicate a grouped readout 
of wires) for shaping, further amplification and digitization.  The anode wire signals (X-
direction) were more simply grouped to 8 lines which were then pre-amplified, shaped 
and digitized.  Eight adjacent readout lines (either grid or anode) therefore sampled a 
distance of 16 mm sufficient to contain all candidate WIMP recoil tracks [13].  Voltages 
on the grid lines were sampled at 2 MHz while the anode lines were sampled at 1 MHz.  
The 20 wires at the edges of the grid and anode planes were grouped together to provide 
veto signals for each MWPC. All lines were digitized from -1000 µS to +4000 µS 
relative to the trigger with 12 bit digitizers.  Triggering of the data acquisition system 
(DAQ) occurred if the sum of the grid lines fell below -100 mV (roughly -200 ADC 
counts).  As discussed in [10], the region bounded by the vetoes and the inner grid planes 
formed a fiducial volume of 1 m
3
 equating to 167 g mass of CS2 within which recoil 
events could occur.  Each side of the detector was instrumented with an automated, 
retractable, ~100 µCi 
55
Fe calibration source which allowed periodic (every 6 hours) 
monitoring of detector gain and functionality. 
3. Experimental configurations  
DRIFT-IIa was placed within the scientific laboratory of the Boulby Mine and data 
accumulated in both unshielded and shielded configurations.  Here we describe these 
configurations and present estimates of the ambient neutron flux incident upon the 
detector in both cases.  A measurement of the actual ambient neutron flux follows in 
section 8. 
Below the DRIFT-IIa detector, a cavity 10 m long, 3.3 m wide and 45-55 cm deep 
was constructed providing sufficient space for under-floor passive neutron shielding.  
Regularly spaced (10 cm wide, 25 cm deep) wooden beams laid over central 1 m wide 
columns of ~15 cm polypropylene sheet provide structural support to the floor.  The 
remaining gaps are filled with loose polypropylene pellets.  Above this floor three 
adjustable steel legs raised the base of the DRIFT-IIa vessel ~25 cm.  The resulting gaps 
were, again, filled with loose polypropylene pellets.  Overall, the structure provided an 
average of 44 g cm
-2
 of hydrogenous shielding beneath the detector with no significant 
areas of less than 35 g cm
-2
.  In the shielded configuration, additional shielding was 
constructed such that DRIFT-IIa was completely enclosed within a layer of poly-
propylene pellets, of typical thickness 44 g cm
-2
. 
The expected unshielded rate was calculated as follows.  The entire scientific 
laboratory at the Boulby mine, including all shielding, was simulated using a GEANT4 
[17] Monte Carlo.  The rock surrounding the cavern was simulated as pure NaCl of 2.2 g 
cm
-3
 density with U and Th contamination of 60 ppb and 130 ppb, respectively.  These 
values were determined by open Ge detector measurements of gamma-ray background in 
the laboratory where DRIFT-IIa was located [18].  They are also consistent with a recent 
measurement of the neutron flux in another area of the Boulby mine [19].  A modified 
version of the SOURCES code was used to calculate the production rate and spectrum of 
neutrons entering the laboratory due to the decay of radioactive isotopes in the decay 
chains of U & Th for input to the GEANT4 simulation [20].  This gave a neutron 
production rate within the rock of 6.285!10
-8
 neutrons cm
-3 
s
-1
 with a mean energy of 
1.73 MeV.  Within the simulation these neutrons were produced isotropically from the 
rock in a volume up to 3 m deep from the cavern-rock face giving a total active rock 
volume of 7836 m
3
, a rock surface area of 4085 m
2
, and a neutron production rate for this 
volume of 493 neutrons s
-1
.  That a depth of 3 m would be sufficient to accurately predict 
the flux emanating from the walls was determined via an independent simulation which 
indicated that  >99.9% of the neutrons that escape the rock into the cavern originate from 
within a 3 m depth of rock. 
From the simulations it was found that the flux of neutrons at the rock-laboratory 
boundary was 4.53!10
-6 
cm
-2
 s
-1
, while the flux falling on the outer surfaces of the 
DRIFT-IIa vessel was found to be 7.19!10
-6 
cm
-2 
s
-1
.  This apparent increase in flux was 
identified as being due to neutrons scattering in the walls of the cavern and undergoing 
multiple traversals of the laboratory.  The simulated neutron recoil rate within the fiducial 
volume of the DRIFT-IIa detector is shown in Table 1.  To reduce the computational 
burden the density of the CS2 gas was simulated as being 25 times higher than in the 
actual experiment; other simulations confirmed that this would have no impact on the 
results of the simulation. 
The impact of passive neutron shielding has also been investigated. This work 
suggests that enclosing the vessel within a layer of ~40 g cm
-2
 of CH2 reduces the rate of 
nuclear recoils within by more than a factor of 300 which suggests a rate of background 
neutron events within the shielded configuration of DRIFTIIa of approximately 1 per 
year.  This is in agreement with previous work [20]. 
The data reported here come from 6 kg days in which the detector was not enclosed 
within neutron shielding and 10.2 kg days in which the detector was fully enclosed within 
neutron shielding.  Neutron (
252
Cf) and gamma ray (
60
Co) calibration data sets were 
obtained in both configurations.  Remote slow control and data acquisition systems [10] 
enabled continuous unmanned operation, interrupted only to replenish CS2, retrieve data 
and perform certain calibration runs.  Logged slow control parameters show the detector 
performance throughout to have remained within expected specifications. 
4. Data 
Some examples of events can be found in Figures 2-4.  For each event only a time 
slice around the event trigger is presented.  The left and right plots show data taken from 
the left and right MWPCs respectively.  As discussed bove, the 512 anode and grid wires 
were grouped down to 8 lines for digitization.  The 8 digitized lines from the grid are 
shown at the top while the 8 digitized lines from the anode are shown to the bottom.  The 
waveform presented below each set of 8 lines is the ‘sum line’, calculated simply by 
summing the 8 individual contributions.  Two features should be noted.  Firstly, in reality 
the voltages on the wires for the grid and the anode are of opposite polarity but, for ease 
of viewing, one of them has been inverted; by convention ionization falling on the anode 
is shown with a negative polarity.  Secondly, the gain of the amplifiers for anode signals 
was lower by a factor of ~2.5 than the gain of the amplifiers for the grid. 
Shown between the anode and grid lines are the veto lines.  The anode veto line is 
shown in light blue while the grid veto line is shown in grey.  In light of the convention 
discussed above, an event on these lines caused by, for instance, the electrical ground 
level changing, would appear to have opposite polarities on the grid and anode veto lines 
and thus the signal seen on the sum line, shown in black, would be zero.  Conversely, 
ionization falling on only the grid veto or anode veto, or both, would appear on the 
summed veto line as a negative going pulse. 
The left and right vertical grey lines show the region of interest (ROI) for that event 
while the central grey line shows the trigger time.  The horizontal grey lines below the 
waveforms show the baselines (mostly hidden) and software thresholds for those lines.  
The vertical black hash marks on individual lines show the start and stop times for lines 
surpassing the threshold. 
The waveforms presented in Figures 2-4 clearly show differing morphologies, each of 
which may be identified with a particular class of event type.  The task of the event 
analysis was to implement automated software routines to identify with high confidence 
and high efficiency the waveforms that indicate nuclear recoil events, and for these 
events to determine the relevant physical parameters, such as ionization, track length and 
orientation of the recoiling nucleus.  The scope of this paper does not include a detailed 
discussion of this analysis.  Much of the analysis procedure has already been discussed in 
[13].  A full description of analysis of DRIFT-IIa data can be found in found in [21]. 
5. Fe calibrations 
Work by this collaboration to be published elsewhere [21]  has shown that a 
parameter !  may be constructed that is proportional to the integral of the voltage and 
therefore proportional to the charge falling on the anode wires. In order to monitor this 
proportionality constant, each side of the detector was exposed every 6 hours to a 
55
Fe 
calibration source. The centroid of the 
55
Fe photo-absorption peak at 5.9 keV was 
measured and corresponds to 300±40 number of ion pairs (NIPs) at 40 Torr in CS2..  Gain 
variations (as much as 50%) were measured to ~2% accuracy, providing time-dependent 
calibration constants.  Again full description of this analysis data can be found in found in 
[21]. 
6. Nuclear recoil trigger efficiency 
Critical to the success of any dark matter experiment is an understanding of its 
response to nuclear recoils.  To this end, the DRIFT-IIa detector was exposed to a 
252
Cf 
source in a variety of geometries over an extended period of time.  Neutrons from the 
252
Cf source, interacting with the DRIFT-IIa gas, produced S recoils well matched to 
those expected from WIMP interactions.  C recoil events and Compton scattering events, 
produced by the gamma-rays emitted from the 
252
Cf source, were also, of course, 
produced.  The activity of the source at the time of the exposures was 11600±600 
neutrons/sec (manufacturer’s information and an independent measurement).  This source 
was contained within a lead canister of wall thickness 1.3 cm and outer dimensions 5 cm 
diameter by 11 cm length.  Experimental runs were performed with DRIFT-IIa exposed 
to this canister directly.  When not used the canister was stored in a tackle box filled with 
wax of outer dimensions 22cm!25cm!35cm when closed.  Further exposures were 
conducted with this tackle box opened, in which case the upper 13 cm of the box was 
moved sideways, completely exposing the top region of the lead canister. Table 2 
summarizes the 5 experimental configurations in which 
252
Cf source data were collected. 
Fig. 5.  shows the trigger rate as a function of time for a continuous run in which the 
neutron source was present at the beginning of the run and then removed.  As can be 
seen, there is a clear transition in the raw data acquisition event rate corresponding to the 
removal of the source.  In order to compare these data to theory a simple set of cuts were 
required so that NIPs could be accurately calculated for the triggered events.  These cuts 
were developed to allow DRIFT-IIa to be used as an accurate proportional counter.  They 
also serve as the basis for additional cuts to remove background events, discussed later.  
A full description of the analysis of the DRIFT-IIa data can be found in found in [21].  A 
short description of these cuts is provided here. 
First, all waveforms were required to fall within the limits of the digitizer to ensure 
that the ! parameter be accurately measured.  Second, no ionization was permitted on the 
veto lines ensuring that the events were fully contained.  Finally, for each triggered event, 
1000 µS of pre-trigger information and 4000 µS of post-trigger information were saved 
to disk.  As nuclear recoils generated by WIMP are expected to last no more than a few 
hundred µS, it was found advantageous to focus the analysis on a ROI within the data 
record.  For the nuclear recoil analysis the ROI extended from -200 µS to +500 µS 
relative to the trigger time.  For most of the statistics generated only data within the ROI 
were analyzed.  Waveforms were required to be below threshold at the edges of the ROI 
to ensure that the ionization could be properly measured. 
For each location and configuration of the 
252
Cf source, the difference between 
average rates (with these simple cuts) with the neutron source present and average rates 
with the neutron source absent were calculated.  The results are shown in column 2 of 
Table 2.  Complete simulations using GEANT4 [17] were performed, modeling each of 
the experiments described; column 3 of Table 2 presents the predicted rates.  As will be 
demonstrated below, hardware thresholds and software cuts resulted in the fiducial 
volume of DRIFT-IIa being entirely insensitive to Compton recoils induced by gamma-
rays from the 
252
Cf source.  However, for this analysis, the higher electric field strength 
present in the MWPCs and the simple nature of the cuts meant that DRIFT-IIa was 
sensitive to photon induced Compton events in the MWPCs.  Hence, the simulation also 
modeled the gamma-ray emission from the 
252
Cf source and recorded any event that 
deposited energy within the MWPC.  This rate amounted to ~15% of the nuclear recoil 
rate.  The combination of the simulated fiducial volume nuclear recoil rate and MWPC 
gamma-ray rate produced a simulated rate accurately modeling the experimentally 
detected rate.  Column 4 of Table 2 shows the ratio of the experimental and simulated 
rates with all statistical errors included.  It is worth emphasizing that the good agreement 
between calculated and measured rates that is demonstrated in Table 2 is achieved for a 
range of exposure geometries and intensities, separated by several months.  This suggests 
that the response of DRIFT-IIa to neutrons is well understood and stable, that the activity 
of the calibration neutron source is correctly known, that the normalization of ! to NIPs 
and energy to NIPs, in the Monte Carlo, is being performed consistently, and that the 
live-time and fiducial volume are well known.  While Table 2 shows the overall 
efficiency within a window of 1000 – 6000 NIPs, Fig. 6 shows the efficiency 
(experimental rate divided by simulated rate) as a function of NIPs for a typical case.  
The fall off in efficiency above 6000 Nips is due to C recoils which are cut in the data 
due to their long ranges which meant they were not contained in the ROI.  This shows 
that DRIFT-IIa can be operated in a mode in which, between the experimental threshold 
and the maximum reasonable energy for WIMP-induced recoils, ~100% efficiency for 
recording nuclear recoils can be achieved.  Moreover the good agreement between theory 
(which did not include Compton events in the fiducial volume) and experiment is 
evidence that the detector is insensitive to Compton events in the fiducial volume.  The 
software cuts employed in this mode are, however, unable to reject all non-nuclear recoil 
events (Compton events in the MWPC for instance), and thus additional event rejection 
criteria are required.  As will be seen below, these result in excellent background 
rejection, but also impact the WIMP-recoil identification efficiency. 
7. Nuclear recoil analysis 
The overall trigger rate for the detector was ~1 Hz.  Most events were clearly not 
nuclear recoils and could easily be discarded by suitable cuts.  The application of the 
simple cuts discussed above, for instance, reduced the rate to ~0.25 Hz.  The alpha-
particle event shown in Fig. 3 was cut by these simple cuts because the ionization 
extended beyond the ROI.  Additional cuts were then chosen that optimized nuclear 
recoil acceptance efficiency, as measured by exposure to 
252
Cf neutrons, while 
simultaneously reduced background events. 
As discussed in [13] a class of events called “ringers” formed a large fraction of all 
events recorded to disk.  Several features of these events, discussed in detail in [21], show 
that they are not associated with ionization of recoiling electrons or nuclei, most 
significantly, that their rate did not increase in the presence of gamma-ray or neutron 
producing sources.  Ringer events were therefore removed from the dataset. 
Ionization created inside the MWPC, whether caused by sparks or ionizing particles, 
was rapidly collected on the anodes due to the large electric field in this region.  Cutting 
such events with a width cut effectively provided a veto for the two remaining sides 
making up the cube of the DRIFT-IIa fiducial volume. 
Nuclear recoil events in the energy range of interest for WIMP searches (~1 keV/amu 
[22]) are expected to be short, see [13].  Therefore, any event which caused all 8 anode 
lines to fall below threshold was cut.  A C or S recoil that registers on all 8 anode wires is 
at least 12 mm long as the anode wires are separated by 2 mm.  A S recoil with an 
average range of 12 mm has an energy of 660 keV (~20 keV/amu) and produces 19,000 
NIPs [13].  A C recoil with an average range of 12 mm has energy of 120 keV (~10 
keV/amu) and produces 4,200 NIPs [13].  If two or more anode wires were “hit” 
(voltages go below threshold) they were expected to be adjacent to each other.  Finally 
for some events it was observed that a significant fraction of the ionization appeared on 
lines which did not trigger the analysis.  This is in contrast to the expectation that nuclear 
recoils should have a high density of ionization and therefore these events were removed 
from further analysis. 
The likelihood that the short nuclear recoil events DRIFT was designed to detect 
would appear on both sides of the detector (crossing the central cathode) is extremely 
small.  Nevertheless, in the background data (unshielded and shielded) such events were 
found with an unexpectedly high frequency, see Fig. 7.  The origin of these events is 
identified and discussed later, but for the analysis presented here it was appropriate to 
implement a cut that removed these events from the data. 
Finally, some events were observed in which ionization appeared, unexpectedly, on 
the anode prior to the start of the ROI.  This type of ionization was called pre-ionization.  
Events of the same character were observed in the DRIFT-I data. Fig. 8 illustrates an 
example of such an event from DRIFT-IIa.  The likely origin of these events is discussed 
later, but for the analysis presented here it was appropriate to remove them. 
These cuts reduce the accepted rate of events by a factor of ~350 relative to the 
trigger rate.  They also reduce the neutron detection efficiency.  This is shown in Fig. 9 
which plots the efficiency as a function of NIPs for the “Tackle Box” 
252
Cf run with the 
background cuts applied to the data.  In the context of Fig. 6 it is clear that neutron events 
recorded to disk are being removed by these cuts.  We believe, however, this set of cuts 
to be reasonably well optimized.  The efficiency curve in Fig. 9 falls faster than that in 
Fig. 6 at higher NIPs values.  This, again, is due to long-range C recoils. 
8. Gamma-ray rejection 
A significant source of background in dark matter searches are electrons that result 
from gamma-ray interactions or, to a lesser extent, radioactive decay.  In DRIFT, 
rejection of electrons relies on their long range and lower ionization density relative to 
that of a nuclear recoil event [13].  The very low drift speed for ionization in DRIFT-IIa 
coupled with a ~4 µs shaping time and 1 or 2 MHz readout meant that this low density 
translated into low amplitude voltage signals on the readout lines.  Thus, as discussed in 
[13] an appropriately set threshold prevents these events from triggering the detector or 
analysis while still preserving a high trigger efficiency for nuclear recoil events. 
In order to measure DRIFT-IIa’s gamma-ray rejection capabilities five 0.52 µCi  
60
Co 
sources were placed on top of the unshielded DRIFT-IIa detector, three in the center and 
two on either side of the central cathode.  0.571 days of live-time data were collected. 
A Monte Carlo simulation using GEANT4 [17] was employed that included the 
running conditions and geometry of the 
60
Co exposure.  Rates of interaction, energy 
deposition for each electron recoil, directional information and timing of the events were 
all simulated.  Any event that deposited energy within the fiducial volume was recorded 
as an interaction and NIPs value for that event calculated.  The background cuts, 
including cuts to remove events occurring in the MWPC, discussed above were applied to 
the data for this analysis and therefore events occurring within the MWPC were not 
included in the simulation results. 
The data analysis technique was similar to that for the calculation of neutron 
efficiencies, including background cuts as already discussed.  A comparison was made to 
data taken without the sources present, with durations 1.42 and 1.68 live days, 
immediately before and after the 
60
Co data was collected to the 
60
Co data.  This 
comparison was complicated by the high rate of Compton interactions during the 
60
Co 
exposure.  According to the Monte Carlo, the rate of interactions was 197±1 Hz for a 500 
NIPs threshold.  On average, therefore, there was approximately one 500 NIPs or greater 
Compton event in a 5 ms data record.  This extra ionization frequently triggered the cuts 
associated with ionization falling outside of the ROI causing the observed rate with the 
60
Co source nearby, with all background cuts, to be slightly below the background rate.  
These cuts therefore had to be turned off for this analysis.  The limits derived below are, 
therefore, somewhat conservative. 
The rate of events surviving analysis cuts without the 
60
Co sources present was  
subtracted from the rate with the sources present.  The results of this calculation, as a 
function of NIPs, are shown in second column of Table 3.  All of the rate difference data 
are consistent with zero.  The Monte Carlo simulated data are shown in the third column.  
The 90% C.L. rejection factors are shown in the 4
th
 column. 
 9. Results and discussion  
Fig. 10 shows the distribution of NIPs for all retained events accrued in 16.8 days live 
time of unshielded running.  The most striking feature of this histogram is the large peak 
between ~1000 and ~2000 NIPs.  The lower limit is a consequence of the hardware 
trigger threshold and is discussed in detail in [21]. 
A GEANT4 [17] simulation of the gamma-ray background in DRIFT-IIa was 
performed to simulate the gamma-ray activity inside an unshielded DRIFT-IIa detector.  
This calculation revealed that there were 7x10
5
 interactions per day occurring in DRIFT-
IIa in an energy range of 1000 – 10000 NIPs.  With the appropriate rejection factor 
above, this implies a background rate of < 2.1 events per day (90% C.L.).  The events 
seen with the unshielded DRIFT-IIa detector were not due to gamma-ray interactions. 
The vast majority of the events in Fig. 10 have now been identified as being due to 
heavy ions recoiling into the active volume of the vessel following alpha-particle decay 
that has occurred on the wires of the central cathode.  Nuclei unstable to alpha-particle 
decay are located on these wires as a consequence of the presence of Rn, which it is 
believed has emanated from components within the vessel.  
222
Rn is unstable to alpha-
particle decay (t1/2=3.8 d): when this decays the daughter, 
218
Po, will appear as a charged 
ion and will be attracted to the large negative potential of the cathode [23] where it plates 
out.  
218
Po has a half-life against alpha-particle decay of 3.05 m.  Given the random 
orientation of decay, and that it was occurring on a surface, one expects that some 
fraction of the time the alpha-particle would have been emitted into the 20 µm diameter 
central cathode wires.  The range of these alpha-particles, in the stainless steel cathode 
wire, is typically 12-18 µm [24], significantly less than the width of the wires.  A simple 
Monte Carlo of this process suggests that this would have occurred 37% of the time.  In 
these cases the recoiling heavy ion is oriented into the active volume of the detector, 
leading to a nuclear recoil event being observed.  The energy of these events is 
determined by the fraction of kinetic energy carried off by the heavy ion for the given Q-
value of the alpha-decay.  In the case of 
218
Po, the Q-value for alpha-decay is 6.115 MeV, 
which results in a recoiling 
214
Pb with a kinetic energy of 112.2 keV.  The resulting 
ionization generated is calculated as follows: In [25] it was found that the W factor for 
214
Po was 4.5 times higher than the W factor for alpha-particles in Ar.  Taking 26.3 eV as 
the W factor for alpha-particles in Ar [26], multiplying by 4.5 to account for the 
difference in W factor, and multiplying this by 19.7 eV/26.3 eV to account for the lower 
W factor in CS2 (300±40 NIPs at 5.9 keV as discussed above), and assuming that the W 
factor for 
214
Po is the same as for 
214
Pb, gives W = 88.6 eV.  This implies a typical 
ionization level of 1300 NIPs.  In comparison, the peak of the energy distribution seen in 
Fig. 10 occurs at ~1500 NIPs, very close to this prediction.  Events of this type are 
henceforth classed as radon progeny recoils (‘RPR’s).  Other progeny from this decay 
chain may also produce RPR events with similar energies. 
This hypothesis explains the unexpectedly high number of events with simultaneous 
ionization on both sides of the detector.  On the one side is the RPR while on the other is 
the accompanying alpha particle which did not stop in the wire.  It also might explain the 
pre-ionization events as the pre-ionization may be due to x-rays produced as the alpha 
particle slowed in the wire, which then interact in the gas ahead of the ionization from 
RPR. 
The presence of radon inside the DRIFT-IIa vacuum vessel has been confirmed in 
several ways.  Firstly, events consistent with 222Rn decays were observed in the DRIFT-
IIa data set.  An example is shown in Fig. 11.  This event traversed the detector’s central 
cathode, and having no detectable veto signal its origin must have been within the gas.  
The change in the height of the peaks in this event may be interpreted as a measure of the 
changing rate of energy loss, dE/dx.  The wires are evenly spaced and alpha-particle 
tracks in gas are approximately straight at these energies [24].  With this in mind the 
Bragg Peak is visible for this track on the right detector at t ~ 300 µs consistent with the 
ionizing behavior of alpha-particles.  Finally 5.486 MeV alpha-particles from the decay 
of 
222
Rn have a range of 339±13 mm in 40 Torr CS2 [24].  The track range in "x and "y 
were measured by counting peaks and multiplying by the 2 mm spacing of the wires; "z 
was measured by calculating the beginning and end of the event, on each side, and 
multiplying by the measured drift speed.  This event was then measured to have a total 
track length of 351±5 mm in good agreement with the prediction. 
Finally, the unshielded data set was re-analyzed with software routines that searched 
for fully contained alpha-particle tracks, that is long tracks, that both crossed the cathode 
and did not register on the veto lines.  Here we term such events as gold plated cathode 
crossing  (GPCC) events.  Fig. 12 shows the rate of GPCC events as a function of time 
for the first ~two weeks of unshielded data.  The red line shows the time when evacuation 
of the vessel stopped and filling with CS2 started.  One would expect the rate of GPCC 
events to increase and then saturate on a timescale given by the half-life of parent nucleus 
and the flow rate of gas through the detector according to the following formula, 
 ! 
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where R is the rate at which cathode crossing decays occur, "  is the 222Rn lifetime (5.52 
days), # is the 1/e flush time for the system (3.15 days), and $ is the constant rate at 
which these events are supplied.  $ is the only free parameter in this formula.  As can be 
seen on Fig. 12 the data are well fit with this function.  A similar analysis was performed 
looking at the time dependence of the RPR events themselves; this is shown in Fig. 13 
and is again consistent with this function.  That the time evolution of the rate these two 
disparate types, nuclear recoil and alpha, of events are well fit by the same function is, 
perhaps, the strongest evidence for the RPR hypothesis. 
RPR events were present, as expected, in the shielded data.  However, these events 
form a peak (see Fig. 10) whereas Table 1 indicates that the recoils from neutrons will 
have a rather hard spectrum.  Consequently, a window in NIPs from 3000-6000 NIPs was 
chosen for this neutron flux measurement in an attempt to maximize signal to noise.  The 
limits of this window were chosen (i) to avoid, as much as possible, the tail of the RPR 
peak shown in Fig. 10 and (ii) to avoid the loss of efficiency shown in Fig. 9.  Within this 
window the expected rate of recoils was 0.3±0.1 events per day with a 100% efficient 
DRIFT-IIa detector. 
Interestingly, the events in this window, designed to avoid RPR events, showed a 
similar increase in rate after pump out as the GPCC and RPR events did in Fig. 12 and 
Fig. 13, though with much lower statistics.  Fig. 14 shows the rate as a function of time 
for events in this 3000-6000 NIPs window in the shielded data.  As can be seen, there is a 
significant increase in rate during the first few days after the detector was pumped out 
well fitted with the same function used to fit the other rate increases.  One possibility is 
that these are RPR events in which the alpha particle, initially directed into the wire, 
scatters off of the stainless steel and emerges with greatly reduced energy on the same 
side of the TPC as the RPR event.  While simulations of angular straggling suggest this to 
be feasible, quantitative estimates of this concept are ongoing. 
For simplicity, events for the unshielded/shielded measurement were only considered 
if they occurred at least 1 week after a pump out ensuring that the rates were at their 
steady state values, see for instance Fig. 13.  For the unshielded data, with data analysis 
that included cuts as discussed above for detection of nuclear recoils, 61 events were 
found in 12.03 days of live time giving a rate of 5.1±0.6 events per day.  For the shielded 
data, using identical data analysis and cuts, 67 events were found in 11.1 days of live 
time, giving a rate of 6.0±0.7 events per day. Subtracting the unshielded from the 
shielded rate leaves -1±1 events per day, consistent with zero.  With all of the cuts in 
place the average efficiency over all of the neutron exposures performed during the 
shielded and unshielded runs was 32±1% for the 3000-6000 NIP recoil range.  Thus the 
observed difference in rate implies that the actual difference is -3±3 events per day.  An 
upper limit on the rate is <4 events per day (90% C.L.).  If not for the unexpected 
appearance of the RPR events and the mysterious 3000-6000 NIP events sensitivity to the 
predicted rate could have been achieved. 
10. Conclusion 
DRIFT-IIa is a 1 m
3
 gaseous TPC detector.  First results are reported here for its 
operation in the Boulby laboratory in which 6 kg days of data were collected with the 
detector open to the laboratory environment, and 10.2 kg days of data were collected with 
the device completely enclosed within hydrogenous shielding.  A gamma-ray rejection 
capability is measured to a level of better than 8!10
-6
 for all energies above a threshold of 
1000 Nips, while an ability to record 94±2(statistical)±5(systematic)% of the nuclear 
recoils occurring inside the detector within a 1000 < NIPs < 6000 ionization range is 
demonstrated.  Application of additional cuts that reduce the rate of all non-nuclear 
events by a factor of ~350 are shown to reduce the nuclear-recoil efficiency to ~60% near 
threshold.  An unexpected population of nuclear recoil events has been observed, and are 
shown to be due to the decay of the daughter nuclei of 
222
Rn which have attached to the 
central cathode. An upper limit on the ambient neutron flux within the Boulby mine has 
been measured as <4 neutrons day
-1
, while a rate of 0.3 neutron recoils day
-1
 is predicted.  
Components contributing 
222
Rn to the active volume have been identified; removal of 
these components is underway as well as additional measures to remove or veto these 
events. 
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Tables 
Table 1– The table below shows the predicted rate of recoils from neutrons emanating 
from the walls of the Boulby Underground Laboratory above a NIPs threshold as shown. 
 
NIPs threshold Rate (per day) 
0 25.5±0.6 
20 8.4±0.3 
100 6.2±0.3 
500 2.4±0.2 
1000 1.4±0.1 
1500 1.1±0.1 
2000 0.9±0.1 
2500 0.7±0.1 
3000 0.5±0.1 
3500 0.50±0.08 
4000 0.35±0.07 
4500 0.33±0.07 
5000 0.32±0.07 
5500 0.27±0.06 
6000 0.19±0.05 
6500 0.12±0.04 
7000 0.12±0.04 
7500 0.07±0.03 
8000 0.07±0.03 
8500 0.07±0.03 
9000 0.07±0.03 
9500 0.07±0.03 
10000 0.07±0.03 
 
Table 2 
Results for rates, experimental and simulated, in a range 1000-6000 NIPs for various 
neutron runs.  A brief description of the runs follows. 
x-neutrons - 
252
Cf source, in lead canister, located 1.44 m away from vessel door in X; 
central in Y & Z. Vessel un-shielded. 
y-neutrons - 
252
Cf neutron source, in lead canister, located 1.44m away from vessel roof 
in Y; central in X and Z. Vessel un-shielded. 
Tackle Box - 
252
Cf neutron source, in lead canister, placed in open wax-filled tackle box.  
Source 12 cm below vessel. Vessel un-shielded. 
Pre-Shielding neutrons - 
252
Cf neutron source in lead canister 20cm from DIIa vessel 
door in X, central in YZ.  Vessel 5/6 shielded (face and 30cm section front roof 
exposed). 
Run type Experimental Rate (present - 
absent) (Hz) 
Simulated Rate 
(Hz) 
Experiment / 
Simulation 
X-neutrons 
June 20 2005 
0.097±0.004 0.109±0.005 89±5% 
Y-neutrons 
June 20, 2005 
0.110±0.004 
 
0.118±0.004 
 
93±6% 
 
Tackle Box 
July 12, 2005 
0.352±0.005 
 
0.365±0.009 
 
96±3% 
 
Pre-shielding 
neutrons 
August 10, 2005 
0.253±0.010 
 
0.262±0.009 
 
97±5% 
 
Weighted 
Average 
  94±2% 
 
 
Table 3 – Shows the rejection factor for various NIPs “windows”.  The second column 
shows the measured, source present minus source absent, rate for a particular range of 
NIPs.  All results are consistent with 0 Hz.  The third column shows the Monte Carlo rate 
expected for that NIPs window.  The fourth column shows the calculated rejection 90% 
C.L. rejection factor.  Roughly speaking the first window 1000-2000 NIPs includes the 
bulk of the RPR peak and therefore generates the worst rejection factor.  The third 
window 3000-10000 NIPs includes the large events discussed in the text. 
NIPs 
Window 
60
Co rate minus Background 
rate (Hz) 
Monte Carlo rate 
(Hz) 
Rejection Factor 
Limits 
(90% C.L.) 
1000-2000 (-2±5)x10
-4 
77±1 < 8x10
-6 
2000-3000 (-1±1)x10
-4 
24.8±0.5 < 5x10
-6 
3000-10000 (2±6)x10
-5 
27.2±0.3 < 3x10
-6 
1000-10000 (1±3)x10
-4 
125.2±0.7 < 3x10
-6 
1000-6000 (1±3)x10
-4 
128.9±0.7 < 3x10
-6 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 - A photograph of the DRIFT-IIa detector during commissioning. 
 
  
Fig. 2  – Recorded waveforms for an event in which a 
252
Cf neutron source was placed 
near the detector.  Background cuts, discussed in the text, reduced the background rate to 
far less than the observed rate for this data set.  Therefore, this was, very likely, a neutron 
recoil event.  The event is clearly visible on lines 2 and 3 (brown and red) on the anode 
(lower pane) on the left side of the detector.  The signals on the remaining anode lines are 
due to induced electrical pickup and thus appear inverted.  The signal on the grid is 
induced and since the anode-grid separation is quite large (1 cm) the signal on the grid 
appears on many wires. 
 
Fig. 3  – A several MeV alpha-particle has a range such that it can travel over many 
anode and grid wires.  If it traverses more than 8 wires it will, because of the wire 
grouping, reappear later on the same readout line, possibly multiple times.  Given the 
length of this event, the quantity of ionization and the fact that the anode veto line (light 
blue) received ionization, this is very likely an alpha-particle event. 
 Fig. 4  – As discussed in [10] every 6 hours the left and then the right detector were 
exposed to an 
55
Fe calibration source.  In the data shown above the left side was being 
exposed.  4 events, though small, are visible on the anode and grid.  None are visible on 
the right consistent with the expected attenuation of 5.9 keV x-rays.  Because of the way 
in which these events were analyzed no ROI is shown. 
 Fig. 5 – This plot shows the trigger rate of the detector for a continuous run.  At the 
beginning of this run the 
252
Cf source was 1.44 m away from one face of the vacuum 
vessel.  At a time of ~171.3 days from the start of 2005 the source was removed.  There is 
a clear change in the rate at this time. 
  
Fig. 6 – The experimental rate divided by the simulated rate as a function of NIPs for the 
“Tackle Box” neutron run.  The vertical pink lines indicate the region of interest for the 
analysis shown in Table 1.  The horizontal pink band shows the systematic uncertainty in 
the source strength, 5%. 
 Fig. 7 - A nuclear recoil-like event having simultaneous ionization on both sides of the 
detector. 
  
Fig. 8 – An event showing pre-ionization associated with the main event which triggered 
the system. 
  
 
 
Fig. 9 - The experimental rate divided by the simulated rate as a function of NIPs for the 
“Tackle Box” neutron run with all background cuts in place. 
 
  
Fig. 10 – The distribution of NIPs for all of the unshielded data after all cuts.  The green 
and blue vertical lines are the thresholds of the left (green) and right (blue) MWPCs 
during this run. 
 
 
 
 
 Fig. 11 - An example of an un-vetoed cathode crossing alpha (GPCC) event, an event 
well explained by radon decay in the gas. 
  
Fig. 12 – Plot showing the rate of GPCC events as a function of time for the first ~2 
weeks of unshielded running.  The red numbers are file designators corresponding to the 
date when the run started.  The vertical red line shows the time when the vacuum pump 
was turned off and the vacuum vessel started filling with CS2.  Under RPR hypothesis, 
this would have also been the time when radon began emanating into the detector. The fit 
is discussed in the text and appears to be consistent with the hypothesis.  The gap in the 
data resulted from time spent performing neutron exposures. The fit indicates # = 
1075±150 day-1 with a reduced chi-squared of 1.5. 
 
 
Fig. 13 – This plot shows the rate of RPR events as a function of time.  The red numbers 
are file designators corresponding to the date when the run started.  The red line shows 
the time at which the evacuated vacuum vessel was filled with CS2.  Shortly thereafter 
runs were started. The fit for this plot indicates # = 1450±175 day-1 with a reduced chi-
squared of 0.55. 
  
Fig. 14 – A plot of the rate of events from the shielded runs with 3000 < NIPs < 6000. 
Interestingly the rate of events in this NIPs window, designed to avoid RPR events shows 
a rate increase similar to that exhibited by the RPR events. 
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